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"He who seeth inaction in action and action in inaction, he is wise among
men, he is harmonious, even while performing all action."
- Bhagavad Gita
INTRODUCTION
Are beneficial omissions treated the same as beneficial commissions of the
same magnitude? Does it actually matter?
In this Article I argue that while scholarship has paid attention to the omis-
sion bias in the context of harms (i.e., the discounting of harms caused by omis-
sions relative to harms caused by commissions), it has not considered the omis-
sion bias in the context of benefits (i.e., the discounting of benefits caused by
omissions relative to benefits caused by commissions). This Article argues not
only that we should recognize beneficial omissions, but also that policymakers
should pay more attention to beneficial omissions than to either beneficial or
harmful commissions.
These ideas can readily be applied to environmental policy. Should exter-
nalities be internalized by compensating individuals who refrain from generat-
ing negative externalities or by taxing individuals who generate negative exter-
nalities? According to standard economic analysis, there is no difference
between penalizing individuals who generate the negative externality and cred-
iting those individuals who abstain from generating the negative externality.
According to neo-classical economics, the level of externality generated will be
identical whether we impose a fine for the harmful commission or offer a credit
for the beneficial omission. Thus, the tendency to internalize through focusing
on harmful commissions rather than beneficial omissions is traditionally as-
sumed to be without significance.
With environmental externalities as my focus, I will argue that the way in
which these externalities are internalized is in fact significant. This is true for six
reasons. First, providing a credit for non-pollution overcomes the potential in-
efficiencies of traditional cap-and-trade mechanisms. Second, internalizing by
crediting non-polluters neutralizes the wealth effect and therefore serves as a
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more efficient way of generating an incentive to abstain from pollution. Third,
crediting non-polluters may generate a stronger incentive with lower transac-
tion costs. Fourth, such a scheme may redistribute wealth more efficiently in
cases where there is a strong correlation between socioeconomic status and ab-
stention from consumption of a certain commodity. Fifth, the transfer of re-
sources I suggest is preferable because it acknowledges the fact that the recipient
of the transfer has contributed to the social good. The fact that the beneficiary is
not always motivated by a desire to contribute to society does not change the
fact that she has made a contribution. Sixth, when compared with a scheme that
achieves internalization through penalization, it is more likely that a scheme of
internalization through positive payments will succeed in the legislative process.
As I explain below, a scheme with stronger support from small groups is signifi-
cantly more likely to pass through political-economy barriers.
The internalization of beneficial omissions may have the most obvious ad-
vantages in environmental policy. The central goal of environmental policy is
the internalization of external costs.' Existing scholarship has discussed the dif-
ferences between different forms of internalization. The two relevant divisions
are carrots versus sticks' and taxes versus spending.' This Article seeks to shed
light on an additional angle of this choice that has not been discussed: the in-
ternalization of externalities from omissions versus the internalization of exter-
nalities from commissions.
Part I surveys existing scholarship on the omission bias and highlights a
phenomena this scholarship has not yet addressed-beneficial omissions. Part
II proposes the use of a negative-consumption tax ("NCT") as a mechanism for
internalizing beneficial omissions in the environmental field. Part III lays out
the advantages of focusing on beneficial omissions rather than beneficial or
harmful commissions. Part IV presents three possible modes of implementing
the NCT. The Conclusion suggests several other fields in which providing cred-
its for beneficial omissions may be appropriate.
1. See ALFRED ENDRES, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: THEORY & POLICY (2010).
2. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCKING THE POWER OF INCENTIVES
TO GET THINGS DONE (2010); Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade
Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2149-64 (1995);
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, Carrots, Sticks and the Multiplication
Effect, 26 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 365 (2009); Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots:
Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797
(2012).
3. See WILLIAM BAUMOL & WALLACE OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
211-34 (2d ed. 1988); Robert E. Kohn, When Subsidies for Pollution Abatement In-
crease Total Emissions, 59 S. ECON. J. 77 (1992); Donald Wittman, Liability for
Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 62-5 (1984). See generally
David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Pro-
grams, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004) (discussing the relevant criteria for the choice be-
tween taxes and spending programs).
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I. OMISSION BIAS IN CASES OF HARMFUL AND BENEFICIAL OMISSIONS
The bias in favor of omission harms rather than equivalent commission
harms has been extensively discussed in the literature. In a famous Article, Dan-
iel Kahneman and Amos Tversky demonstrated this bias using a simple experi-
ment. They concluded that individuals have a stronger emotional reaction to
negative outcomes caused by an action than they do to an equivalent negative
outcome caused by inaction.4
Vaccinations are a classic example of the omission bias. Ilana Ritov and
Jonathan Baron have demonstrated that people consider the risks associated
with vaccinations to be more serious than the risks associated with foregoing
vaccinations, even when the actual risks are equivalent.' Ritov and Baron found
that the central element of the omission bias is the fact that harms caused by
omissions are perceived as having been caused indirectly.'
Given the extensive literature documenting an omission bias when individ-
uals are weighing relative harms, one would expect a similar tendency to dis-
count beneficial omissions. The beneficial consequences of omissions may also
be perceived as having been caused indirectly, leading to the undervaluation of
these benefits. Studies by Janet Landman7 and by Faith Gleicher' indicate that,
in some cases, individuals are biased toward action when the consequences of
both the omissions and commissions are positive.
While most of the behavioral literature focuses on biases displayed by ordi-
nary individuals, the omission bias in cases of beneficial omissions also affects
the formation of public policy. Policymakers tend to prefer mechanisms that
internalize externalities by focusing on commissions; they neglect the option of
internalization through focusing on omissions. Such focus on the treatment of
4. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, 246
Sci. AM. 160 (1982). Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated the omission bias with
an experiment that asked subjects to evaluate two scenarios. In the first scenario,
an individual owns stock in A and considers switching to B. The individual sticks
with A, but later learns that, had he switched to B, he would have made an addi-
tional $1200. In the second scenario, an individual owns stock in B, considers
sticking with it, but ultimately decides to switch to A. He later learns that had he
not made the switch, he would have made an additional $1200. Kahneman and
Tversky's showed that the individual in the second scenario would be more upset,
even though both economic outcomes were the same.
5. See Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Am-
biguity, 3 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 263 (1990).
6. See Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Omission Bias, Individual Differences and Nor-
mality, 94 ORG. BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 74, 78-84 (2004).
7. See Janet Landman, Regret and Elation Following Action and Inaction: Affective Re-
sponses to Positive Versus Negative Outcomes, 13 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 524 (1987).
8. See Faith Gleicher et al., The Role of Counterfactual Thinking in Judgments of Af-
fect, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 284 (1990).
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commissions may lead policymakers to overlook the possible advantages of en-
couraging beneficial omissions instead of punishing harmful commissions.
Previous scholarship has extended the behavioral analysis of individuals to
policymakers. A number of studies have demonstrated that the omission bias
applies not only to laypersons, but also to sophisticated and professional experts
such as judges.9 Max Bazerman, Jonathan Baron, and Katherine Shonk extend-
ed the analysis of behavioral biases to the policy and government level.'o My
study aims to march on the same path.
An illustration of the existence of an omission bias with regard to beneficial
omissions at the public-policy level can be found in "feebate" schemes. In these
schemes a fee is levied on one person and then rebated to another person who
makes a more socially desirable purchase. For example, in a feebate scheme,
customers who buy high-emission cars pay a fee that is then rebated to people
who buy low-emission cars." Feebate schemes have been implemented in a few
European countries, including France, Denmark, and Norway." In the past, a
feebate scheme was been adopted in Canada, 3 and one is now under considera-
tion in California. 4
9. For studies demonstrating how judges are prone to biases, see Chris Gurthrie &
Tracey George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the "Affirmative Ef-
fect" on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357 (2005); Chris
Guthrie, Jeffery J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); and Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A
Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583 (2003).
10. See MAX H. BAZERMAN, JONATHON BARON & KATHERINE SHONK, YOU CAN'T
ENLARGE THE PIE: Six BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (2001).
11. Such a scheme avoids some problems that afflict cap-and-trade mechanisms. In
cap-and-trade schemes, when an actor reduces pollution, it inadvertently incen-
tivizes other actors to increase emissions by increasing the number of pollution
permits available. A feebate scheme does not have such an adverse effect on other
actors in the market.
12. David S. Bunch et al., Potential Design, Implementation, and Benefits of a Feebate
Program for New Passenger Vehicles in California, TRANSP. SUSTAINABILITY
RESEARCH CTR. (2008), http://tsrc.berkeley.edu/sites/tsrc.berkeley.edu/fdes/
Feebate%20Program%20California.pdf.
13. The short-lived Canadian feebate system was started in 2007 and ended in 2009.
Id. at 57-59. One of the reasons for revoking the rebate was that it did not remain
revenue neutral. De facto feebates exceeded fees. See id. at 63.
14. One of the first feebate programs was implemented in Sweden in the energy-
production sector. Rebates were given to factories that emitted low levels of nitro-
gen oxide relative to the amount of energy produced, and fees were imposed on
factories with high nitrogen oxide omissions relative to the amount of energy
produced. This program was very successful. It aimed to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions by thirty five percent in five years. It reached that target in only three
years. After five years emissions had declined by sixty percent. Katrin Millock &
Thomas Sterner, NOx Emissions in France & Sweden, in CHOOSING
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But the feebate scheme raises a question: why should the rebate be limited
to individuals who do buy a car? Needless to say, those who do not own or drive
a car emit less pollution than car owners, even those who drive low-emitting
vehicles. Why restrict the feebate to owners of cars that emit a low level of emis-
sions, instead of providing it to individuals who abstain from car emissions al-
together? Such a scheme does not seem to make much sense from the perspec-
tive of either fairness or efficiency. The only reason for excluding these
individuals from the rebate is the high number of non-car users whose behavior
is inelastic. They would not own a car even if no feebate was available to them.
But discriminating between individuals based on their elasticity raises fairness
concerns. From the economic perspective, transferring resources to such indi-
viduals is not inefficient. Rather, it is mainly a transfer effect. The main reason
for excluding these individuals from such a scheme seems to be political. Poli-
cymakers attempt to reduce the cost of the program in order to increase the fea-
sibility of its implementation.
Furthermore, the feebate scheme suffers from a built-in problem that
might defeat its ability to achieve an overall reduction of emissions: the rebound
effect. The increased fuel efficiency induced by the feebate scheme might lower
the fuel price per mile. As a result, individuals might increase their total travel
miles, causing an overall increase in emissions. 5
Scholars have justified feebate programs on the grounds that these pro-
grams promote technological advances and accordingly reduce long-run emis-
sions. But this argument is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, there is no un-
equivocal evidence that emission reduction through technological advancement
offsets the incentive to abstain from consuming dirty commodities altogether.'"
Second, incentivizing abstention from consumption of a dirty commodity
might also generate technological advancements-perhaps ones that enable cit-
izens to rely less on car transportation altogether.
So why is it that feebate schemes are limited to individuals who purchase
cars, and do not apply to individuals who avoid car usage altogether? The omis-
sion bias may shed some light on this problematic policy choice. Buying a low-
emitting car instead of a high-emitting car is perceived as a commission on the
part of the purchaser. In contrast, an individual who contributes to the envi-
ronment by abstaining from buying a car altogether is perceived as benefiting
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: COMPARING INSTRUMENTS AND OUTCOMES IN THE U.S. &
EUROPE 117 (Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern & Thomas Sterner
eds., 2004); see Kenneth C. Johanson, Feebates: An Effective Regulatory Instrument
for Cost-constrained Environmental Policy, 34 ENERGY POL'Y 3965, 3966 (2006).
15. See Bunch et al., supra note 12, at 261-62; Kenneth A. Small & Kurt Van Dender,
Fuel Efficiency and Motor Vehicle Travel: The Declining Rebound Effect, 28 ENERGY
J. 25 (2007).
16. Johanson, supra note 14, at 3966. The asymmetry between the internalization of
positive and negative externalities may also influence the focus on fining car users,
rather than crediting non-users. See Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public
Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2009).
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the environment only indirectly, and the value of such contribution is discount-
ed accordingly.
II. THE MECHANISM FOR INTERNALIZING BENEFICIAL OMISSIONs: THE NEGA-
TIVE-CONSUMPTION TAX
There are several ways in which environmental externalities can be inter-
nalized, including (1) taxing harmful commissions, (2) taxing harmful omis-
sions, or (3) crediting beneficial commissions. Another common method is to
place a regulatory ceiling on the total allowable amount of pollution and then
permit the trading of individual quotas. This type of policy is commonly known
as cap-and-trade. The NCT provides an additional and novel way to internalize
externalities: by crediting beneficial omissions. In particular, the NCT provides
a refundable tax credit to individuals who do not consume or use certain dirty
commodities.
It may be argued that there is no economic difference between a tax on pol-
luters and a credit for non-polluters. Both instruments may yield the same eco-
nomic outcome. However, this is not necessarily true if one accepts that public
goods and private goods are not fully convertible. By taxing polluters, the value
of public goods from which non-polluters benefit increases equally to the value
of private goods they would have received by crediting them the value of their
non-pollution. Yet the benefit the non-polluters gain from the increase in pub-
lic goods may not be as high as their benefit from an increase in private goods.
In order to convert the increase in the level of public goods to an increase in the
level of private goods, there is a need to target non-polluters and provide them
a credit.
The NCT can be described as a version of a tradable pollution quota regime
in which the quota can be sold back to the government. In essence, individuals
are given a permit to pollute through the consumption of a dirty commodity,
but can sell back their permit to the government. It makes no difference wheth-
er individuals (I) are not penalized for performing an action that directly harms
the public or (2) are credited for abstaining from an action that directly harms
the public.7 From the perspective of standard economic analysis, the two are
17. There might be one crucial difference between internalization of omissions
(which requires a credit) and internalization of commissions by means of a tax. A
credit might incentivize certain actors to perform activities that have a potential
for generating negative externalities so they would qualify for a credit for refrain-
ing from generating the externalities and thus overall the credit will increase the
number of actors generating negative externalities. This point was famously raised
by Ronald Coase. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 41-42
(1960); see David A. Koplow & Philip G. Schrag, Carrying a Big Carrot: Linking
Multilateral Disarmament and Development Assistance, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 993,
1026-42 (1991); Jonathan B. Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument
Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 726-7 (1999). This problem does not
apply to the NCT. Any individual is entitled to the credit-the credit is not based
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equivalent. If the harm avoided is equal in magnitude to the benefit conferred,
then the effects of the two policies on society are equivalent.'" The claim that
policymakers should prefer one over the other calls for an explanation.
The NCT can be classified as a downstream regulatory mechanism. In con-
trast to upstream cap-and-trade mechanisms, which apply to polluting produc-
ers, the NCT applies to the consumers of polluting commodities. While up-
stream regulatory mechanisms are the most effective instruments in the
abatement of pollution in the production process,' 9 downstream regulatory
mechanisms may reduce external costs to a greater extent. This is because
downstream mechanisms are effective in fostering a fundamental change in
consumption habits.2 0 By conferring benefits to consumers, especially those
consumers of low socioeconomic status who are most prone to modify their
consumption habits, the NCT may generate social benefits as well as promote
environmental goals.2
There are three conditions necessary for the implementation of the NCT-
one administrative condition and two substantive conditions. The administra-
tive condition is that government agencies must be able to easily and cheaply
obtain information about which individuals consume the dirty commodities
on one's previous consumption pattern and thus does not incentivize generating
negative externalities ex ante.
18. Even though the two are economically equivalent, a tendency to take positive ex-
ternalities generated by action more strongly might be explained by an effect simi-
lar to the Knobe effect. In the Knobe effect, an individual judges differently two
equivalent cases in which the agent has foreseen the externalities of his actions,
but those externalities have not played any role in motivating him to perform the
action. In cases where the externalities are negative, people tend to attribute inten-
tion to the agent in the causation of the consequences. But in cases where the ex-
ternalities are positive, people tend not to attribute intention to the agent. See
Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language, 63
ANALYSIS 190 (2003). Similar to the case of the Knobe effect, the agent might dif-
ferentiate between two equivalent cases in which the agent has foreseen the exter-
nal consequences of his actions but is not motivated by them.
19. See Debbie Niemeier et al., Rethinking Downstream Regulation: California's Oppor-
tunity to Engage Households in Reducing Greenhouse Gases, 36 ENERGY POL'Y 3436,
3438 (2008).
20. Lawrence Baker et al., Effect of Consumption Choices on Fluxes of Carbon, Nitrogen
and Phosphorus Through Households, 10 URB. ECOSYSTEMS 97 (2007).
21. Upstream regulation tends to be more regressive than downstream regulation.
Typically, abatement costs for producers are passed down to consumers in the
form of higher energy prices. A low-income household will bear a greater finan-
cial burden as a proportion of earnings due to the universal price increase. See
David Fleming, Tradable Quotas: Using Information Technology to Cap National
Carbon Emissions, 7 EUR. ENv'T 139 (1997). The social benefits I discuss are dis-
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with which the NCT is concerned. The two substantive conditions stem from
the policy considerations described above. The first and more obvious condi-
tion is that the consumption of the commodity must generate considerable ex-
ternal costs. As with standard green consumption taxes, there is no rationale for
applying the NCT to commodities that do not generate a significant negative
externality. The second substantive condition is that consumption of the com-
modity must serve as a reasonable proxy for the socioeconomic status of the
consumer. This is a key condition for many of the normative justifications dis-
cussed in the next Section.
There are various ways of implementing the NCT. The policy's different in-
stantiations exist across two dimensions. The first is the revenue dimension.
Although the NCT seems at first glance to be a spending program, its budgetary
effect depends on the context in which it is implemented. For example, the
NCT could be coupled with a positive tax. While non-polluters would receive a
credit, polluters would be taxed. Similar to a feebate mechanism, the NCT
could be designed as a revenue-neutral system by imposing a positive consump-
tion tax that raises sufficient revenue to cover payments and administrative
costs. (The choice as to how to fund the NCT depends mainly on budget con-
straints and political economy considerations and will not be discussed in this
Article.)
The second dimension is whether the NCT is implemented in a continuous
or binary structure. A uniform credit could be provided to individuals who
generate pollution under a certain level, or the level of the credit could be de-
termined in proportion to the pollution level. Using a binary credit allows for a
greater correlation between socioeconomic status and receipt of the credit. Us-
ing a continuous credit allows for the more accurate internalization of exter-
nalities. These two dimensions of the NCT will be discussed more extensively in
the Section that deals with the practical implementations of the NCT.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR FOCUSING ON INTERNALIZATION OF BENEFICIAL OMIs-
SIONs THROUGH THE NCT
This Part will present six arguments for the NCT. The first three arguments
focus on the NCT as a mechanism for enhancing internalization. The remaining
three arguments concern secondary policy goals that the NCT promotes.
A. The NCT as an Efficient Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
As noted in the previous Part, the internalization of beneficial omissions
through the NCT is essentially a tradable pollution-quota regime in which the
quota can be sold back to the government. Similar to the NCT, under a cap-
and-trade regime it is possible to provide positive payments for non-pollution.
Under the NCT, individuals are given a permit to pollute by consuming a dirty
commodity but can sell their permit back to the government through the NCT
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mechanism. This version of cap-and-trade is considerably more efficient than
the standard cap-and-trade regime."
A cap-and-trade regime imposes a limit on the total amount of pollution
that can be generated. But a standard cap-and-trade regime does not impose a
floor. Under cap-and-trade, pollution can be generated even if its value to the
polluter is less than its social cost. 3 Individuals use the permit to pollute. They
may also transfer the right to pollute to other parties, even when the value of
the permit to the polluting party is lower than the social cost of pollution, so
long as its value to the user is greater than zero. In such cases, the pollution is
inefficient because, in the aggregate, it reduces social welfare. Such inefficient
pollution could be prevented if the permit could be sold back to the govern-
ment for a price that reflects the estimated social cost of the pollution. Under
such a regime, the pollution permits will not be used if the private value of the
pollution is lower than the cost it imposes on society. In such cases, individuals
will prefer to sell back their permits to the government for a higher value than
the value they (or a third party) attribute to the pollution rights. 4
Here is an illustrative example. Assume that the estimated social cost of
each ton of CO. emission is $10,000. Further assume that there are two factories
that produce iron and these are the only CO, polluters in the economy. The
22. The most significant cap-and-trade mechanism adopted in the United States is
the SO, Allowance Trading Program, which was established under section 14 of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2006). This program allocated allowances for
emission of SO2 by electric power units, which could be transferred or saved for
later use. A penalty was imposed on emissions which exceeded the allowance
which the plant holds.
23. Such a consequence will occur under cap-and-trade mechanisms in which the
permits are freely endowed to the parties, such as in the case of the United States
S02 Allowance Trading Program. Freely endowing permits may assist in confront-
ing the problems raised in the scholarship with a permits regime, such as the stra-
tegic usage of permits by incumbent companies to keep new entrants from com-
peting or the extraction of scarcity rents by actors who buy substantial shares of
the permits. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap and Trade System to
Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 293, 355 (2008). Decentraliza-
tion of the ownership of permits through the free allocation of permits may assist
in mitigating these problems. There might be other ways to eliminate the centrali-
zation of permits without freely endowing them, such as freely endowing options
for permits. The main reasons why initial free allocation of permits is adopted are
political. The free endowment of permits increases the political feasibility of the
program.
24. While there has been some limited discussion regarding a cap-and-trade mecha-
nism, to my knowledge no such scheme has actually been implemented. For a
brief discussion of such a model, see Georg Grill & Luca Tachini, Cap-and-Trade
Properties Under Different Hybrid Scheme Designs, 61 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT.
107, 109-10 (2011). For a discussion of different variations to the conventional
tradable pollution quota regime, see Tsilly Dagan & Talia Fischer, Rights for Sale,
96 MINN. L. REV. 90, 121-23 (2012).
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value of each ton of pollution is a decreasing function, in which every ton is
valued $1,000 less than the previous ton. For Factory A the first ton is worth
$14,000, and for Factory B the first ton is worth $12,000. Each factory is allocat-
ed five tons of CO, emission.
In the first scenario, the government implements a conventional cap-and-
trade regime in which it decides to cap emission to ten tons and allocates each
of the factories a permit to emit five tons. Under such a regime, Factory A will
end up with a permit to emit six tons, buying a permit to emit one ton from
Factory B. Factory B will end up with a permit to emit four tons. The value of
the marginal ton of emission for each of the factories is $9,ooo. Thus, the social
costs for the last four tons of emissions is $40,000, and exceeds the private
benefit to the two factories ($38,ooo).
In the second scenario, the government offers a negative-consumption tax
after allocating the emissions permits. Under this regime, the government
would offer to buy back permits for a price equal to their social cost of $1o,ooo.
Such a policy will ensure that the amount of pollution will not exceed the social
optimum. Factory A would be credited for selling back to the government a one
ton polluting permit, and Factory B would be credited for selling back to the
government a permit for three tons of pollution.
The sell-back cap-and-trade mechanism of the NCT is especially relevant in
cases where (1) there is substantial asymmetric information regarding the eco-
nomic value of polluting and (2) the government and environmental agencies
are relatively ignorant regarding the value of the permits in the market. In such
cases, it is not sufficient for the government to put a ceiling on the quantity of
pollution; it also needs to put a floor on the price of each pollution permit if it
seeks to eliminate all inefficient pollution. Assuming policynakers prefer a cap-
and-trade mechanism to a tax mechanism (perhaps due to lower administrative
costs), they should opt for the NCT.
B. The NCT as a Means for Controlling Wealth Effects
Due to the wealth effect, positive taxes face stronger limitations on the
magnitude of the tax than do negative taxes. Imposing a green tax of a high
sum, in which the individual has to buy the right to pollute, bars individuals
with low incomes from the option of buying the right to pollute. This is true no
matter how strong the intensity of their preference for purchasing the option to
pollute. This is due to the wealth effect: an individual may not be able to pur-
chase the right to pollute due to a lack of disposable income, even though such
a right would be highly beneficial to her. This low-income individual may value
the right to pollute much more than well-off individuals who ultimately pur-
chase the right.
One might argue that the wealth effect is a de minimis cost of green taxes
and can therefore be ignored. But in many cases the ability to purchase the right
to pollute can be extremely important for the disadvantaged, and barring them
from the ability to purchase the right to pollute may have substantial ramifica-
tions on their future development and welfare.
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The application of the NCT to car ownership demonstrates this point. Im-
posing an extremely high cost on car usage-in the form of a fuel tax, tolls, or a
direct tax on car ownership-may substantially limit the mobility of individuals
who cannot afford to pay the tax. The tax may impose considerable restrictions
on their autonomy, ability to find jobs, and their efforts to improve their eco-
nomic situation." In the case of a positive tax, these individuals are essentially
forced to refrain from consuming the commodity because they do not have the
necessary resources to pay the tax. In contrast, in the case of the negative tax,
they are endowed with the right to own the commodity, and, although they
have a strong incentive to cash-in that right, they are not forced to abstain from
consuming the commodity. This is not a subsidization of pollution: it does not
affect the relative price of pollution to other goods, but only changes the initial
base-line of whether the individual is endowed with the right to pollute.
There might be other ways of addressing this problem within the frame-
work of a green tax. It may be possible to impose a means test for the green tax
whereby only individuals with an income above a certain threshold would be
required to pay the tax. However, such a policy would have a few problems. The
first is that including a means test as part of a green tax would impose consider-
able administrative costs and would impair the tax's administrative elegance,
which is one of its prime advantages. The second is that excluding low-income
individuals from the green-tax scheme would undermine the efficiency of the
green tax in eliminating inefficient pollution costs. Considerable parts of the
disadvantaged population will incur no costs when polluting and thus will still
generate sizable amounts of inefficient pollution. Thus, in order for the tax to
be effective in the internalization of the external costs, a larger tax would have
to be imposed. Accordingly, it is preferable to use a negative tax rather than a
positive tax to ameliorate the wealth effect.
C. Internalization of Beneficial Omissions Through the NCT as a Means of
Generating Stronger Incentives
Internalization of beneficial omissions through the NCT may generate a
stronger behavioral incentive than an economically equivalent positive tax. The
two following Subsections discuss the stronger incentive that could be generat-
ed through the NCT. The first will explain how the NCT can generate a stronger
incentive, and the second will explain why generating a stronger incentive is de-
sirable.
1. The NCT as an Internalization Mechanism that Generates Stronger
Incentives than Other Mechanisms for Internalization
25. For a discussion of the distributional significance of enabling minorities and the
poor to commute to work, and the impact of the option to commute to work on
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If the wealth effect can be controlled, a positive green tax of a certain sum
and a negative-consumption tax that provides an equivalent credit should both
lead to the same pollution equilibrium. The same amount of cars would be pur-
chased, regardless of whether a person has to pay an extra $1oo to own a car or
receives $ioo in exchange for not owning a car. The economic incentive is the
same in both cases. The individual would have $ioo more if she decides not to
own a car than if she decides to own one.
Behavioral analysis changes this picture. Framing the $1oo as a prize for not
polluting might generate a stronger incentive to abstain from polluting than the
payment of $ioo. This is true because individuals are likely to perceive the pay-
ment as merely part of the price of the dirty commodity. Although classic be-
havioral theory suggests that penalties generate a stronger incentive than bo-
nuses," the case of a green tax versus an NCT is somewhat more complex.
Paraphrasing Uni Gneezy and Aldo Rustinchi's Article "A Fine is a Price,"" one
might argue that a tax constitutes a price. A tax on a commodity is likely to be
perceived as part of the commodity's price. In their Article, Gneezy and Rustin-
chi demonstrate how imposing a fine may in fact encourage the fined behavior
instead of suppressing it. When the fine is conceived as part of the "price," its
effect on the behavior of individuals is often weaker than might be expected. In
contrast, a bonus may generate a stronger incentive than the tax, inspiring indi-
viduals to abstain from buying the commodity. The bonus will never be per-
ceived as part of the price of the commodity, but rather will be viewed as inde-
pendent compensation. As such, it will have greater impact on the behavior of
individuals.
Professors Yuval Feldman and Oren Perez argue that green taxes may have
a "payment effect." The fact that one is paying the costs of pollution has a moral
purification effect, which legitimizes pollution and may increase usage of the
dirty commodity.' Under the NCT, the polluter does not pay any direct price
for his actions; therefore there is no act of moral purification, and thus the de-
sire to avoid pollution may be intensified relative to a positive green tax. Thus,
relative to the conventional framing of a positive green tax, the NCT's framing
may be more effective in deterring individuals from using the dirty commodi-
ties.
It could be argued that a credit for environmentally beneficial behavior will
backfire and weaken the incentive to abstain from pollution. Scholars have
26. See Edward McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Tax Policy in an Era of Rising Inequali-
ty: The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1745, 1750
(2005).
27. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).
28. Yuval Feldman & Oren Perez, How Law Changes the Environmental Mind: An Ex-
perimental Study of the Effect of Legal Norms on Moral Perceptions and Civic En-
forcement, 36 J.L. SOC'Y 501, 527 (2009).
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demonstrated how private incentives can "crowd out" altruistic incentives. 9
Turning an otherwise selfless behavior into an action which promotes self-
interest may weaken the incentive of individuals who are attracted to the warm
glow of altruism. In other words, the extrinsic financial incentive might crowd
out the intrinsic incentive for maintaining a clean consumption pattern.
The crowding-out critique should not apply to credits for the abstention
from consuming polluting commodities. According to some models of altruis-
tic behavior, people are motivated to behave altruistically when their behavior
signals their altruistic character to others.3o This is what some scholars label the
reputational motive.3 The addition of an external motive muddies the altruistic
signal.
According to this argument, there is unlikely to be a crowding-out effect in
cases in which there are built-in self-interest motives for performing an action
(or inaction). In these cases, due to the extrinsic motives that accompany the
altruistic behavior, performance of the behavior does not clearly signal the al-
truistic character of the agent. As a consequence, adding an additional extrinsic
motive is unlikely to decrease reputational incentives because there is no strong
motive from the start. Because the signal is accompanied by noise from the
start, adding additional extrinsic motivation should not substantially alter the
noise-to-signal ratio.32 For that reason, crediting beneficial omissions (such as
abstaining from consuming dirty commodities) will not have a significant
crowding-out effect. For example, choosing not to own a car does not transmit
a strong reputational signal regarding one's altruistic character because of the
many other possible self-interested motives for not owning a car (cost savings,
fear of accidents, and the like). Since the reputational signal is weak from the
29. See RICHARD TITMUss, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL
POLICY (1971) (showing that programs which compensate blood donors weaken
the incentive to donate blood); Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of
Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON.
REV. 746, 751-52 (1997) (showing how the willingness of a town to accept a nu-
clear-waste site decreases when compensation is offered); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rus-
tichini, Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All, 115 Q.J. ECON. 791, 798-800 (2000) (find-
ing that students collecting donations had greater receipts when offered no
compensation); see also Oren Bar-Gill & Chaim Fershtman, Public Policy with En-
dogenous Preferences, 7 PUB. ECON. THEORY 841, 843-44 (2005) (explaining how a
subsidy for a public good might decrease its supply in the long-run).
30. See Paul Seabright, Continuous Preferences Can Cause Discontinuous Choices: An
Application to the Impact of Incentives on Altruism (Institut D'Economie Industri-
elle, Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4322, 2004),
http://neeo.univ-tlsel.fr/1221/1/continuous-preferences.pdf.
31. See Roland Binabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, AM. ECON.
REV. 1652, 1653-54 (2006). B6nabou and Tirole point to reputation, together with
intrinsic and extrinsic reasons, as the motivations driving altruistic behavior and
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start, adding additional extrinsic motivations such as refundable tax credits
would not have any substantial crowding-out effect.
This point can be crudely applied to omissions in general. Due to the lower
salience of omissions, the signaling component is unlikely to be a significant
factor in motivating an omission. As a result, the crowding-out effect caused by
extrinsic rewards is much weaker in the case of omissions than in the case of
commissions. 33 Thus, policymakers' focus on omissions should be greater than
their concern for commissions due to the weaker adverse crowding-out effect
when adding external motivations.
2. The Desirability of Generating a More Powerful Incentive
The Subsection above may raise the following question: why is it desirable
to provide a strong incentive for not polluting? In truth, it is desirable to avoid
generating both too weak an incentive and too strong an incentive. The eco-
nomic incentives should be set at the exact point at which the costs of pollution
of the marginal commodity equal the marginal benefit of its usage. Strengthen-
ing economic incentives past this point may have a sub-optimal effect, because
individuals may refrain from consuming the dirty commodities even when it
would be efficient to pollute.
However, there are three justifications for employing a behavioral frame to
create a bias toward avoiding pollution: (1) counter-balancing the status quo
bias, (2) the precautionary principle, and (3) minimizing transaction costs and
optimizing the motivational mix.
a. Counter-Balancing the Status Quo Bias
According to the status quo bias, individuals tend to overestimate the value
of assets or rights they already possess. 34 In the case of pollution, people will
tend to overestimate the value of the dirty commodity they currently possess or
consume. If a policy designed to decrease the usage of the polluting commodity
through the internalization of the external costs of the pollution is adopted,
then the frame that creates the strongest bias against the pollution should be
endorsed. Due to the status quo bias, it is very likely that the polluting com-
modity is overvalued. Thus, when designing the mechanism through which the
33. There are no empirical studies which compare the crowding-out effect in cases of
omissions and commissions, but there is some data indicating that the crowding-
out effect applies in the case of penalties. See Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motiva-
tion Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURV. 589, 599-600 (2001). But see Yuval Feld-
man & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Re-
wards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEx. L. REv.
1151, 1205-06 (2010) (arguing that there is no crowding-out effect in the case of
penalties).
34. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Mak-
ing, 1 J. RISK& UNCERTAINTY 7, 45-46 (1988).
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pollution costs are internalized, a frame that creates a bias against the pollution
of the commodity should be adopted in order to cancel out the status quo bias
towards maintaining the polluting behavior.
b. The Precautionary Principle
The second justification for creating a bias toward refraining from pollu-
tion is the precautionary principle. This principle prescribes tilting policy deci-
sions toward environmental considerations.35 There are many interpretations of
what exactly the precautionary principle entails, and I will address three that are
most relevant to the NCT.36 One interpretation of the principle is that the error
costs of over-pollution are higher than the error costs of under-pollution, be-
cause the error costs of over-pollution are irreversible and serious. For example,
concentration of greenhouse gasses is an effect we cannot roll back. The reversi-
bility of many of the non-environmental costs-such as in the car, air travel,
and electric consumption examples discussed below-has substantial value
which should be taken into account.37
The second interpretation of the precautionary principle calls for society to
offset our tendency to underestimate environmental costs by aiming for a pol-
lution level that is lower than the estimated optimal amount.38
35. The precautionary principle is widely accepted internationally and has been in-
corporated into environmental policy. It has, for example, been endorsed in the
Rio Declaration, see INDUR GOLANSKY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 5 (2003), and in the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Changes, see id. at 16.
36. For an overview of the different interpretations of the precautionary principle, see
Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in RETHINKING THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1 (Julian Morris ed., 2000); Richard B. Stewart, Envi-
ronmental Regulatory Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 20 RES. L. & ECON. 71,
75-76; and Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1003, 1011-15 (2003).
37. Regarding the option value of reversible decisions, see Kenneth J. Arrow & An-
thony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 88
Q.J. EcON. 312 (1974). Cass Sunstein notes that every action is irreversible in the
sense that time is linear and it will never be possible to make the alternative deci-
sion in the same point of time. See Cass Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 841, 860-63 (2005). For that reason, he adopts a more limited
definition of reversibility-whether the decision carries with it sunk costs, defined
as costs which are not recoverable. Id.
38. The underestimation of costs stems from the availability bias. Individuals tend to
focus on the scenarios that are cognitively more available to them. See Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCI. 1124, 1127 (1974). For the application of the availability bias to the pre-
cautionary principle, see Sunstein, supra note 36, at 1009. Sunstein argues that the
precautionary principle not only may not cancel out the availability bias, but may
even be driven by the bias. Familiarity may significantly impact the cognitive
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The third interpretation of the precautionary principle calls attention to the
"unknown unknowns" which are typical in the case of pollution. In the estima-
tion of pollution costs, there is much greater uncertainty than in the estimation
of many other costs. This is a result of scientific doubts regarding the conse-
quences of pollution and the inherent uncertainty that accompanies any long-
term projection. This uncertainty justifies a larger safety margin, which should
lead policymakers trying to avoid uncertainty in the direction of under-
pollution. Thus, the precautionary principle could be understood as a variation
of a maximin strategy in cases of genuine uncertainty. Genuine uncertainty
characterizes many situations of environmental costs, including the greenhouse
effect. 9
c. Incentivizing Through Behavioral Means: Minimizing Transac-
tion Costs and Optimizing Motivational Mix
The arguments above do not themselves justify adopting a frame that is tilt-
ed against polluting behavior. Even if one accepts the argument that policymak-
ers should aim for an equilibrium in which the pollution level is lower than the
assessed optimal level, this does not necessarily entail achieving this level
through behavioral means. The most straightforward method for achieving this
is to increase the economic price of the polluting behavior. One could increase
the level of the positive tax instead of altering the frame to include a positive
consumption tax.
There are two reasons why intensifying the incentive against polluting be-
havior should be executed through behavioral framing and not by changing the
real economic price. The first is efficiency. Increasing the real economic price of
pollution requires greater transfers of real economic resources. Such transfers
are accompanied by transaction costs. In contrast, intensifying an incentive
through behavioral means does not require additional transfers of real re-
sources, and thus the transaction costs that accompany the enhancement of an
incentive through behavioral means are substantially lower.40
Second, the NCT may achieve a desirable "motivational mix." Both indi-
viduals and society might have preferences with regard to second-order motiva-
availability of certain scenarios. Id. In addition to familiarity, there might be other
factors that affect the saliency of certain scenarios over others. Recent experiences
may have greater cognitive availability than past experiences. See Howard
Kurneuther, Limited Knowledge and Insurance Protection, 24 PUB. POL'Y 227, 250
(1976). For this reason, individuals and policymakers may neglect to fully take in-
to account low-probability outcomes that they have never personally encoun-
tered. This can lead to substantial miscalculations and potentially enormous costs
associated with overlooked, low-probability outcomes.
39. Sunstein, supra note 37, at 886-89.
40. Regarding the transaction costs which accompany taxation, see Joel Slemrod &
Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds,
43 IMF STAFF PAPERS 172, 173 (1996).
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tions.4* We might prefer being motivated by internal factors rather than by ex-
ternal factors, even when the magnitudes of the motivations are equal. External
factors exist independently of the subject motivated by them. Internal factors
are subjective or intersubjective elements, such as perception. Although it is
hard to completely separate the two, it is possible to at least distinguish between
the two. Although in order to be motivated both are required, one of the two
may have a greater role in triggering the motivation.
At the level of the individual, it is possible to argue that being motivated by
an internal factor enhances one's sense of autonomy.42 Although the behavioral
framing is not a "pure" internal motivation such as altruism-it is generated by
an external framing-it can be considered an internal motivation relative to
motivations which stem from purely objective external conditions.43 When we
point to a bias, we actually view the internal factor as being the active and more
dominant element in motivating the individual.
On the societal level, the crowding-out of internal motivations by external
motivations may be justified under a cost-benefit analysis in the short run, but
the costs may exceed the benefits in the long run. Crowding-out internal moti-
vations can kill such motivations. Individuals might become accustomed to ex-
ternal motivations only, and the appeal of intrinsic motivations could be sub-
stantially weakened. This might create substantial problems in other cases in
which it is not possible to provide external motivations to replace internal mo-
tivations."
Although the NCT essentially provides an extrinsic motivation for inaction,
as discussed above, it might have greater compatibility with intrinsic motivation
than the alternative of providing an external motivation via a positive tax. In an
incentive generated by a positive tax, the external factors have a greater role-
not paying the additional amount for polluting-while perception has more of
a passive role. In contrast, the incentive of the NCT is based also on an internal
element-how one perceives the payment she receives. Although it is an inter-
pretation of external factors, the intensification of the external factors is by
means of the internal processes of interpretation (in which perception plays a
41. Regarding second-order preferences, see AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE WELFARE AND
MEASUREMENT 84, 99-104 (1982); and Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and
the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 6-10 (1971). For the view that the intrinsic
value of an act is part of the act's outcome, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM 269-71 (1986).
42. Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The Support of Autonomy and the Control of
Behavior, 53 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1024, 1033-35 (1987).
43. Id. This assertion is contestable-one may claim that a behavioral framing is a
stronger form of manipulation than the offering of an external reward, and thus is
a greater infringement on autonomy.
44. Samuel Bowles, Review, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Under-
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much more active role). Thus, even if it is possible to reach the same level of in-
centive through conventional extrinsic-economic means, the "motivational-
mix" under the NCT may be more desirable if one accepts that there may be a
preference for internal motivations over external motivations.
D. The Efficient Enhancement of the Welfare of Disadvantaged Individuals
Policies that provide credits for beneficial omissions might be justified
within a cost-benefit framework, even though they may be much more costly to
administer than policies that penalize harmful commissions. Although there are
substantial costs associated with the recognition of beneficial omissions that the
direct benefits do not necessarily offset, there may be indirect benefits that off-
set these costs. The indirect benefit is the efficiency of enhancing the welfare of
individuals of low socioeconomic status by reassigning them resources through
a merit-based system. The individuals' contributive action plays a significant
role in their entitlement to resources based on their merit or virtue.45 As noted
above, the credit for contribution through an omission might be refundable if it
exceeds the individual's tax liability.46
While the receipt of funds by individuals of low socioeconomic status in
conventional transfer programs is frequently accompanied by substantial stig-
ma costs,4 7 the transfer of resources to those very same individuals in the con-
text of merit transfer programs will not be accompanied by such costs. The re-
sources are not transferred to them based on the fact that they are
disadvantaged individuals, but rather due to their positive contribution to soci-
ety. Scholars have noted that many of the social policies that attempt to pro-
45. Regarding merit, virtue, and other possible bases for desert claims, see GEORGE
SHER, DESERT 109-32 (1987). Regarding the justification of desert in cases in
which the agent has not intended to generate positive externalities, see Adi Lib-
son, Redefining Tax Fairness: The Equal Contribution Principle (Sep. 29, 2013)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Bar-Ilan University) (on file with author).
46. The claim that redistribution through the legal system outside the classic tax and
transfer redistributive mechanisms may be more efficient goes against the domi-
nant strand in the current literature, which claims that such redistribution creates
a "double distortion." See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is
Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667,
669 (1994); David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute In-
come?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 446-53 (2003). But see Richard S. Markovits, Why
Kaplow and Shavell's "Double Distortion Argument" Articles Are Wrong, 13 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 511, 550-55 (2005); Brett H. McDonnell, The Economists' New Ar-
guments, 88 MINN. L. REV. 86, 111 (2003); Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstruct-
ing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1006-11 (2001).
47. DAVID ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT 115 (1988).
445
YALE LAW& POLICY REVIEW
mote the welfare of the least well off in society are often self-defeating. 8 The ef-
fect of a welfare policy on the recipients of that policy is not only a function of
the amount of resources transferred, but is also a function of the form in which
the resources are transferred. In many cases a side effect of welfare policies is to
damage the self-esteem of the recipients.49 This psychological cost might be
greater than the benefits of the social programs."o Policies that target those who
are worse off may reinforce an image of the recipients as "inferior" members of
society who have to be "taken care of' by social institutions.5' Transferring re-
sources to individuals in response to their contribution to society bypasses these
costs in cases in which there is a strong correlation between contribution and
socioeconomic status. This possibility is too often overlooked in the scholarly
literature, perhaps due to the methodological difficulties of incorporating the
effect of the form of redistribution.52
E. The Normative Conception of Citizenship as a Justification for Internali-
zation of Beneficial Omissions Through the NCT
One of the central advantages of internalizing beneficial omissions through
the NCT is that it underscores the social contribution of individuals of low so-
cioeconomic status that otherwise would not have been acknowledged. This
48. See Frank Munger, Dependency by Law: Poverty, Identity and Welfare Privatization,
13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 391, 410 (2006) (describing how welfare law func-
tions as a mechanism for social control instead of an empowering mechanism).
49. See ELLWOOD, supra note 47, at 115; Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax
Credit and The Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REv. 533,
565 (1995). For other advantages of universal welfare programs over targeted wel-
fare programs, such as political sustainability, see THEDA SKOCPOL, THE MISSING
MIDDLE 30 (2000).
50. See David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice
Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 830-31 (2004). For an ex-
ample of a study providing a model of the stigmatization effects associated with
welfare programs (and claiming that welfare programs should aim at minimizing
the inability signal they generate), see Tomer Blumkin, Yoram Margalioth &
Efraim Sadka, The Role of Stigma in the Design of Welfare Programs 3-4 (CESIFO
Working Paper No. 2305, 2008), http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/
26350/1/568432398.PDF.
51. ELLWOOD, supra note 47; Munger, supra note 48; Mary Bryna Sanger, Welfare Re-
form Within a Changing Context: Redefining the Terms of the Debate, 23 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 273, 280 (1996).
52. For a discussion of the effect of the context in which resources are transferred on
the welfare and well-being of the individual, see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In
Defense of Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326, 354-57
(2006). Regarding the importance of taking side effects into account, see Elizabeth
Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287 (1999); and Jonathan
Wolff, Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos 27 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 97 (1998).
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justification applies in cases where there is a strong correlation between low so-
cioeconomic status and abstention from consuming a given good. Crediting
such individuals transforms them from non-contributing individuals into con-
tributive citizens.
Individuals of a low socioeconomic status cannot make a significant finan-
cial contribution through the tax system. For this reason, they are sometimes
viewed by society as social burdens-citizens who do not contribute to the so-
cial good. By acknowledging and underscoring their in-kind contribution
through omissions equivalent to the commission of financial contributions,
policymakers would enable these individuals to be treated as contributing citi-
zens.
Framing these individuals as contributors to the social good would treat
them as active, rather than passive, subjects. Such a conception of active citizen-
ship is consistent with Aristotle's normative conception of citizenship as de-
scribed in the Politics. There, Aristotle noted that "[tihe citizen in the full sense
cannot be better defined than by his participation in judicial or political of-
fice."53 On this view, a true citizen should be actively engaged in the functions
that the state executes. Although Aristotle focuses only on involvement in pub-
lic office, some scholars argue that the active component in Aristotle's defini-
tion of citizenship should be extended beyond engagement in political office to
other forms of participation in the life of the polis. Donald Morrison argues that
Aristotle's definition presents citizenship in the fullest sense. 54 However, there
may be forms of participation which embody Aristotle's conception of citizen-
ship but do not involve taking part in political office. Indeed, active citizenship
can be fulfilled through engagement in the production of public goods. By abet-
ting pollution, one is directly producing a public good, whether through ab-
stention from pollution or through other means.
Hannah Arendt's conception of citizenship is also derived from the Aristo-
telian approach. According to Arendt, one of the central elements of citizenship
is "the right to be seen in action."55 Recognizing the individual's active contri-
53. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS III (Richard Robinson trans., 1995). It is important to note
that Aristotle's conception of citizenship is not descriptive but normative. Aristo-
tle admits in his Politics that many states use an alternative definition of citizen-
ship.
54. Donald Morrison, Aristotle's Definition of Citizenship: A Problem and Some Solu-
tions, 16 HIST. PHIL. Q. 143 (1999). Susan Collins also expands the Aristotelian
conception of citizenship. See SUSAN D. COLLINS, ARISTOTLE AND THE
REDISCOVERY OF CITIZENSHIP 129 (2006).
55. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 130 (1963). For a discussion of Arendt's active
conception of citizenship, see MARGARET CANOVAN, HANNAH ARENDT: A
REINTERPRETATION OF HER POLITICAL THOUGHT 124-32 (1992). Arendt's concep-
tion of active citizenship was the main reason for her objection to the modern
structure of representative democracy. She supported an alternative structure of
councils, in which citizens directly engage in the public sphere. See ARENDT, supra,
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bution to society acknowledges his citizenship and status as an active political
subject.
While active contributions are salient and do not need to be highlighted,
the tendency to ignore omissions calls for the assistance of a social mechanism
that acknowledges such contributions. Underscoring contributions that take the
form of omissions is especially significant due to the fact that, for many indi-
viduals with low levels of resources, omissions are their main (and sometimes
only) form of contribution.
The application of Arendt's approach may go hand-in-hand with an ex-
pressive view of the law. According to this view, the form in which a law is
structured has inherent value, separate from its effect on behavior. This is be-
cause the form in which a law is structured conveys a message to the citizenry.56
In the case of the NCT, administering the credit through the tax system
conveys that the recipients received the resources transferred to them in the
context of merit-based desert. Their in-kind contribution to society (abstaining
from generating negative externalities) is equivalent to the paradigmatic contri-
bution of the individual to the state (making a tax payment). Conveying this
message through the legal system is crucial for the ability of these citizens to
view themselves as contributors to society. As stated above, the framing of these
individuals as active contributors is extremely important in light of the afore-
mentioned conception of active citizenship.57
at 258. Regarding Arendt's model for democracy, see J.F. Sitton, Hannah Arendt's
Argument for Council Democracy, 20 POLITY 80 (1987).
56. Regarding expressive theories of law, see Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not
Trumps: Social Meaning, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 725 (1998); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at
Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive
Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election District Appear-
ances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 4833 (1993); and Cass Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996). For a critique of ex-
pressive theories of law, see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skep-
tical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000).
57. It should be noted that adopting the NCT on grounds of the active conception of
citizenship may also be justified under a non-expressive view. Policy not only ex-
presses a certain worldview and incentivizes individuals to behave in certain ways,
but also affects the formation of their preferences. See Bar-Gill & Fershtman, su-
pra note 29. Thus, even if the expression of public values has no value per se, it
might have value in its effect on the formation of preferences and values. Signify-
ing an individual's contribution through omission might enhance that individu-
al's preference for social contribution and active citizenship by making those ac-
tivities more accessible. For a similar argument that policymakers should
internalize the effects of different forms of environmental regulatory mechanisms
on the preferences of individuals, see Michael Livermore, Reviving Environmental
Protection: Preference-directed Regulation and Regulatory Ossification, 25 VA.
ENvT'L L.J. 311, 314-15 (2007).
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This view stands in contrast to the claim made by Professors David
Weisbach and Jacob Nussim regarding the considerations that should be taken
into account when determining whether a spending program should be inte-
grated into the tax system as a tax expenditure or as an independent spending
scheme. Weisbach and Nussim argue that the exclusive considerations for de-
termining whether a program should be integrated into the tax system are cost-
benefit analysis of coordination on the one hand and specialization on the oth-
er. 8
This Article suggests a fundamentally different premise-that the institu-
tion through which the policy is applied has an expressive value and affects the
formation of preferences. Policymakers would be wise to take this premise into
consideration. Although from an economic perspective there might not be any
difference between the two mechanisms, from a legal-expressive perspective
there is a significant difference. Each mechanism used to implement the scheme
conveys a different message to the recipients regarding the reason they receive
payment. The law per se has an effect on the recipients quite apart from the
economic consequences of the law. In addition, the way the law is framed might
have an effect on the formation of the preferences of individuals. 9
The expressive view justifies implementing the NCT, even if the adminis-
trative costs of implementing the NCT through the tax system are considerable.
The NCT is not a subsidy, but rather is an integral part of defining one's proper
tax liability in fairness terms. The state should not take advantage of the fact
that the public goods were supplied willfully, and should provide a credit for
these contributions.60
Providing this credit through the tax system recognizes individuals for their
contribution to society, a contribution that is equivalent to the financial contri-
bution of a conventional tax payment." It does so by increasing the saliency of
the contribution. Thus, among the three main functions of the tax system-
raising revenue, regulating of behavior, and redistributing of wealth 2-the
58. For a detailed account of the advantages and disadvantages of tax expenditures
versus direct spending programs, see Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 3.
59. See Bar-Gill & Fershtman, supra note 29.
60. Cf Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 1147, 1175-
78 (2006) (arguing that there should be a distinction between compensation for
actions that the agent had a moral duty to perform and gratuitous benefits that
the agent had no moral duty to perform).
61. For a discussion of the incorporation of such incommensurable normative con-
siderations into a cost-benefit analysis, see Arden Rowell, Partial Valuation in
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ADMIN. L. REv. 723, 724, 732-38 (2012). Rowell argues
for distinguishing between commensurability and monetizability. Normative con-
siderations should be monetized according to the public's willingness to pay for
the particular normative dimension, even if monetizing only captures a fraction of
the value in question.
62. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAx L. REV. 1, 3 (2007).
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credit given to non-polluting individuals should be classified under the first
function (the one which comprises the "normal tax" baseline"3 ). While the lat-
ter two functions are fulfilled jointly by the tax agencies and by the spending
and regulating agencies, the revenue-raising function is the exclusive province
of the tax system. In order to convey the message that the NCT is an integral
part of the revenue-raising function, the NCT must be situated within the tax
system.64
F. The NCT's Ability to Overcome Political-Economy Barriers
From a public-choice perspective, there is a much greater chance that an
NCT will be adopted than an economically equivalent positive green tax. One of
the greatest barriers that green taxes face is a political barrier-the need for
adoption by the relevant political institutions."' The acceptance of a policy by
the majority and by the government is especially dependent on the effect of the
policy on organized lobby groups. Some scholars have extended models of po-
litical competition to the field of environmental policy. 6 This scholarship as-
sumes the existence of lobbies, and has not attempted to explain the conditions
needed for their formation.
Mancur Olson is the most prominent scholar who has addressed the varia-
bles that affect the formation of lobbies. According to Olson, one of the key fac-
tors for determining whether an interest group will form a lobby is the size of
the group. In contrast to the intuition that large pressure groups are more pow-
erful, Olson claims that small interest groups will tend to form lobbies, while
63. Regarding the concept of the "normal tax" baseline, see Michael J. McIntyre, A
Solution to the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79,
81, 102-03 (1980); and Daniel Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and the Fiscal
Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187, 217-18 (2004). For an argument supporting the ef-
ficacy of the "normal tax" baseline and the tax-expenditure analysis which it ena-
bles, see J. Clifton Fleming Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be
Divorced from a Normative Tax Base?: A Critique of the "New Paradigm" and Its
Denouement, 20 VA. TAX REV. 135, 172-75 (2010).
64. For a similar argument regarding the expressive value of the tax system, see J. Clif-
ton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and
Its International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 492-93 (2008); and Fleming &
Peroni, supra note 63, at 175-79.
65. Robert N. Stavins has argued that "it is important to identify and design [envi-
ronmental] policies that will be optimal in Washington not just from the perspec-
tive of Cambridge, New Haven or Berkeley." Stavins, supra note 23, at 353.
66. See Toke S. Aidt, Political Internalization of Economic Externalities and Environ-
mental Policy, 69 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1988); P.G. Fredriksson, The Political Economy
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large interest groups will not. Thus, the former might have greater impact on
the policies adopted.6 7
Olson's observation sheds light on one of the most significant barriers to
the implementation of environmental policy through green taxes. Most green
taxes impose additional costs on specific segments of the population. According
to Olson's model, a green tax that is especially relevant to a limited segment of
the market will most likely generate a pressure group against the enactment of
such a tax. This reality is explained by the low transaction costs involved in
forming a lobby among a small, limited group. In contrast, it is less likely that a
lobby or pressure group will form among the group benefiting from such a tax,
which in most cases is comprised of the majority of the members of society. Ac-
cording to Olson, it is unlikely that large groups will form a lobby or pressure
group due to the problem of free riding."
The use of a negative tax instead of a positive green tax may aid in over-
coming these political barriers. While a positive tax imposes the costs of inter-
nalization on a small group and the benefits of the internalization on a large
group, a negative tax will have the reverse effect. For instance, in the case of the
internalization of the costs incident to car usage under a conventional positive
tax, car users have to pay a sum that equals the costs they impose on society
through car usage; the rest of society will benefit from the additional revenue
that the tax generates. In contrast, in the case of the negative tax, car users will
benefit from the policy that will not impose on them directly the external costs
of their behavior, and the public at large will be allocated the costs of buying
from the drivers the right to pollute.' 9
67. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1965).
68. For other scholars supporting this view, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 283-95 (1962); and DANIEL FARBER & PHILIP
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 13-33 (1991).
69. Taking into account one's proportional share in public goods, there is no distri-
butional difference in the outcome of a negative and positive tax. Thus, the "win-
ners" and the "losers" under both policies do not change. This point can be
demonstrated through an example. Assume that the external costs of car usage are
$10. There are 90 individuals who drive a car and 10 who do not. The distributive
effect of a positive consumption tax is that individuals who have a car will have to
pay $10 each-$900 in total. Taking into account the rise in public revenue, each
individual benefits by $9 from the increase in the public revenue as a result of the
tax. Overall, the car owners incurred a cost of $1 and the non-car-owners have in-
curred a benefit of $9 as a result of the tax. The distributive effects of a negative
tax are that the non-car-owners receive a credit of $10. In order to finance the
credit, there is a need to spend $100 of the public's funds. Thus, each individual
has to pay $1. Overall the car owners have incurred a cost of $1, and the non-car-
owners have acquired a benefit of $9. This is an identical distributional outcome
as a positive income tax. The claim that the winners and losers in each one of the
policies are not identical has to assume that people discount private benefits and
public benefits differently-they disregard the latter in comparison to the former.
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According to Olson's model, a lobby will be more likely to form in the first
case, where the group paying the cost is both smaller and less diverse. In con-
trast, in the latter case, Olson's model predicts that if a lobby forms, it will be a
lobby for adopting the policy proposed. Such policy leaves the smaller group-
which could more easily form a pressure group-better off.7 0 The example
above might not be relevant in a country with a strong auto industry, such as
the U.S. In such a case, the analysis might be reversed.
V. IMPLEMENTING THE NCT
In this Part, I present three possible applications of the NCT to the realm of
environmental policy. In the conclusion of the Article, I will point to more gen-
eral applications that recognize beneficial omissions outside the realm of envi-
ronmental policy. In each of the examples below, I provide a general blueprint
for how the NCT will work. In the car ownership example, I discuss the
grounds for a binary structure of the NCT. In the air travel example, I address
the application of the NCT to global external costs. In the electricity consump-
tion example, I examine a non-binary application of the NCT.
A. Car Ownership
The classic example for the implementation of the negative-consumption
tax is car ownership.1 Car ownership fully satisfies the first substantial condi-
This does not have to be rooted in behavioral frames, but may be rooted in an
economic justification-that the money they control is worth more to them than
the money which the government controls, and that a public liability does not
spread over all citizens equally.
70. There may be an additional factor which should be taken into account and might
affect the projection above-the means each one of the groups have at their dis-
posal. Although the non-owners of cars are a smaller and more cohesive group,
they also have fewer means at their disposal, which might impede their lobby ef-
forts.
71. There are three ways in which cars could be taxed to reduce the negative externali-
ties they generate: (1) taxing car purchasing, (2) taxing car ownership, or (3) tax-
ing car usage. For the effects of each one of the forms of taxation of cars on car-
bon-dioxide emissions, see Yoshitsugu Yayashi, Hirokazu Kato & Val Teodoro, A
Model System for the Assessment of the Effects of Car and Fuel Green Taxes on CO,
Emission, 6 TRANSP. RES. (PART D) 123 (2001). The main reason that the NCT ap-
plies to ownership rather than car usage is that car ownership better realizes the
second condition listed for the implementation of the NCT. It serves as a stronger
signal for socio-economic status. While owning a car is strongly correlated to so-
cio-economic status, it is less clear if there is such a strong correlation with the use
of a car. Recently, a similar scheme to the one suggested in this Article, in which
carrots are used to incentivize drivers to abstain from driving in peak-hours, has
been tested by researchers at Stanford University. See John Markoff, Incentives for
Drivers Who Avoid Traffic Jams, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2012, http://
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tion for the NCT since the ownership and use of cars creates substantial nega-
tive externalities. The main negative externalities are the air pollution and cli-
mate change resulting from emissions,72 but there are also other externalities
such as noise pollution, congestion.73 In addition, the extensive infrastructure
that care usage demands-such as roads, parking, and emergency medical ser-
vices-comprises a significant share of the overall costs that accompany car us-
age. Damages to property and people in car accidents are an additional and sub-
stantial external cost created by automobile use.74 The aggregated external
costs-including congestions, accidents, air and noise pollution, and climate
change-amount to $0.32 per vehicle miles traveled (VMT).71
www.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/science/experimental-campaigns-pay-drivers-to
-avoid-rush-hour-traffic.html. For discussion of an experiment in Bangalore
which saved 9,000 person hours via a "carrot" incentive to drivers to abstain from
commuting in peak hours, see Deepak Mergu, Balaji S. Prabhakar & N.S. Rama,
An Incentive Mechanism for Decongesting the Roads: A Pilot Program in Bangalore,
PROC. OF ACM NETECON WORKSHOP (2009), http://simula.stanford.edu/Incentive
_mechanisms/NetEconfinal.pdf.
72. Reducing the external costs of gas emission is more complex than it seems. En-
hancing fuel efficiency has adverse effects, which are discussed in the scholarship
as the "rebound effect." The enhancement of fuel efficiency reduces the price of
the commute per mile, which results in an overall increase of car usage and there-
fore may result in an overall increase in fuel consumption and air pollution. See
sources cited supra note 15.
73. Recent scholarship has emphasized reliability costs, which, although associated
with congestion costs, are distinct. The unreliability of commute time is a direct
cost on the drivers. See OECO INT'L TRANSP. FORUM, Improving Reliability on Sur-
face Transport Networks 67, 84 (2010).
74. For a more detailed account of the different negative externalities generated by car
usage, see VICTORIA TRANSP. POLICY INST., TRANSPORTATION COST AND BENEFIT
ANALYSIS: TECHNIQUES, ESTIMATES AND IMPLICATIONS (2d ed. 2009), http://
vtpi.org/tca/.
75. Id. at 8-11. European projections estimate that by 2020 the total of external costs
of car usage in Europe will reach EUR 0.20 per kilometer. See Stef Proost, A Full
Account of the Costs and Benefits of Reducing CO, Emissions in Transport, in THE
COST AND EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICIES TO REDUCE VEHICLE EMISSIONS 151, 158
(2008). Proost approximates that the costs of air pollution together with the cli-
mate change cost will roughly be 0.018 EUR per km, the cost of congestion 0.028
EUR per Km and the cost of accidents 0.019 EUR per km. (All sums are in 2003
EUR value.) Proost's main argument is that a dominant component of the exter-
nal costs consists of the costs which are a direct factor of kilometers driven-
congestion costs and accident costs, as opposed to pollution costs, which are a di-
rect factor of fuel usage. For that reason, a tax on fuel does not perfectly internal-
ize the external cost. Some of the tax on consumption should be levied on kilome-
ters driven and not only on fuel usage for a full an accurate internalization of the
external costs. Id. at 159.
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Car ownership also fulfills the administrative conditions necessary for an
effective NCT. Governmental agencies already maintain databases of car own-
ers, and thus hold complete information regarding individuals who consume
the commodity7' The NCT could therefore be implemented relatively cheaply.
If the NCT were implemented on car ownership, every household that did not
own a car during a certain period of time would receive a refundable tax credit.
Car ownership also satisfies the second substantive condition mentioned
above since it serves as a relatively strong proxy for socioeconomic status. Indi-
viduals of a very low socioeconomic status tend not to own cars, while individ-
uals of a high socioeconomic status mostly do own cars.7 The strong proxy for
socioeconomic status that car ownership provides is one of the reasons for pre-
ferring it over alternative criteria for car pollution, such as miles driven.
The binary feature of car ownership intensifies its correlation to socioeco-
nomic status. The correlation between car ownership and socioeconomic status
is much stronger than the correlation between different levels of car usage and
socioeconomic status because of its clear-cut binary nature?" The binary fea-
ture, however, requires justification. The normative motivations behind using
an NCT suggest that it should not be structured or tailored based on redistribu-
76. Not only does the fact that government agencies already hold such information
reduce the economic costs of implementation, but it also prevents the emergence
of a civil-liberties concern related to the government's collection of additional in-
formation about citizens.
77. For example, according to 1995 U.K. data, in the lowest income decile the average
of cars per person is 0.16, compared to 0.83 cars per person for the highest in-
come decile. Joyce M Dargay, The Effect of Income on Car Ownership: Evidence of
Asymmetry, 3 TRANSP. RES. (PART A) 807, 808 (2001).
78. The mileage gaps between the first and tenth deciles are not as substantial as the
socio-economic gaps between car owners and non-owners. As a study has shown,
a vehicle-mileage tax is not much more progressive than a universal registration
fee, assuming revenue neutrality. While it reduces the annual tax price as a per-
centage of annualized lifetime income of the tenth decile relative to a registration
fee, it also reduces the annual tax price as a percentage of annualized lifetime in-
come of the first decile relative to a registration fee. See Margaret Walls, Distribu-
tional Aspects of an Environmental Tax Shift: The Case of Motor Vehicle Emissions
Taxes, 52 NAT'L. TAx J. 53, 62 (1999). Regarding the regressive effect of both VMT
and fuel tax, see James M. Poterba, Is the Gasoline Tax Regressive, 5 TAX & ECON.
145 (1991); and B. Star McMullen & Lei Zhang, Techniques for Assessing the Socio-
Economic Effects of Vehicle Mileage Fees, OREGON TRANSP. RESEARCH & EDUC.
CONSORTIUM (2008), http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/30000/30200/30267/0801_McMullen-
VehMileageFeesFinalReportFinal.pdf. But see Sarah E. West, Distributional Effects
of Alternative Vehicle Pollution Control Policies, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 735 (2004)
(claiming that, due to the greater elasticity of the mileage driven by lower-income
earners in response to a price increase, the VMT and the fuel tax are less regressive
than is claimed in some scholarship).
454
32:427 2014
MISSING INACTION: INTERNALIZING BENEFICIAL OMISSIONS
tive considerations.79 Its basic structure must be justified on efficiency grounds.
Justifying a binary credit on economic grounds is not a simple task. At first
glance, binary credits seem to be inefficient due to their inelasticity and rigid-
ness."o The need to justify adopting a binary credit may be relevant to other
possible implementations of the NCT.
The efficiency cost of adopting a binary credit is quite high. Dividing peo-
ple into two rough categories-those who generate external costs through car
usage and those who do not-does not seem to correlate closely with the actual
external costs that individuals generate. The credit would have been much more
closely correlated to the actual externalities generated by individuals if it did not
ignore the fact that the different levels of usage are dispersed along a continu-
um. The consequence of a binary credit-treating equally individuals who
make extensive use of their car and individuals who barely use it-seems to vio-
late vertical equity. According to the principle of vertical equity, individuals
with different levels of welfare (or any other metric with which the tax base is
considered) should be treated differently for tax purposes." Treating two indi-
viduals the same for tax purposes, despite the fact that they are quite different
on the very grounds on which the credit is justified, violates vertical equity.12
79. This stems from Kaplow & Shavell's general observation that integrating redis-
tributive considerations and efficiency considerations is inefficient due to the
double distortion it generates. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 46.
80. Regarding the problem of oversimplification in the usage of binary categorization
in transport analysis, see Michael G. McNally & Anup Kulkarni, Assessment of in-
fluence of Land Use Transportation System on Travel Behavior, 1607 J. TRANS. REs.
BOARD 105, 110 (1997).
81. RICHARD MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 160 (1959).
82. It is important to emphasize that this point does not counsel against instituting a
negative environmental tax; it merely raises an objection to the criterion suggested
above for such a tax-car ownership. Instead, one might determine a baseline of
fuel usage or driving mileage, and any individual who consumes less than the
baseline would receive a refundable credit in proportion to how much less than
the baseline she consumed. Such a credit would not have to be binary and would
be far more responsive to the level of external costs the individual generates. A
similar scheme has been already suggested. See Kara M. Kockelman & Sukumar
Kalmanje, Credit-Based Congestion Pricing: A Policy Proposal and the Public's Re-
sponse, 39 TRANSP. RES. (PART A) 671 (2005). According to this suggestion, road
tolls based on congestion externalities should be returned to all licensed drivers in
a uniform fashion. Under such a scheme, drivers who drive less than the average
in high-peak hours will receive a credit which may be refundable. Although this
scheme mainly deals with the external costs of congestion, it could similarly be
designed to deal with other negative externalities of car usage, such as pollution.
This suggestion was built to address one of the central critiques of the conven-
tional congestion pricing mechanism-its regressive distributional impact. For
scholars discussing the inequity of conventional congestion pricing, see Richard
Arnott, Andr6 de Palma & Robin Lindsey, The Welfare Effects of Congestion Tolls
with Heterogeneous Commuters, 28 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL'Y 139 (1994).
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But there are two reasons why a binary credit is not necessarily inefficient.
First, due to the "tyranny of small decisions"" effect, dividing polluting behav-
ior into two broad categories-those who have a car and those who do not-
may be an effective method for internalizing pollution. According to this theo-
ry, if decisions concerning externalities are lumped into one big decision, indi-
viduals would be much more sensitive to the costs they generate. Overall, they
would generate a lower level of externalities through one large decision than the
level they would have reached in a series of small decisions. The tyranny of
small decisions applies to many environmental choices, including driving. In-
deed, it may be desirable to lump the decisions regarding the externalities one
generates through car usage into a one-time decision about whether to own a
car at all.
A second justification for the binary structure is that car ownership may be
a more accurate criterion for estimating the external costs an individual gener-
ates through car usage. There are also some externalities that stem from car
ownership per se and not from the mileage driven in the car. These costs in-
clude the external costs of the infrastructure needed for the import of cars and
the cost for scrap handling of used cars. These external costs are constant per
car, and are not affected by the mileage driven.
Besides fulfilling the threshold condition for the implementation of the
NCT, the car example seems to fulfill some of the central rationales mentioned
in Part II of this Article. Enabling a governmental buy-back option may be very
important in the car example, but on slightly different grounds. In the car ex-
ample, there might be a strong reason for not enabling individuals to trade
permits. While there is a strong reason to endow every household with the op-
tion to own a car, partially on redistributive and fairness grounds, the govern-
ment might not be interested in enabling individuals to aggregate permits. If
this premise is accepted as true, then the government buy-back option may be
needed to replace the ability to trade the permits with others.
B. Air Travel
The NCT might also be implemented in the context of air travel. Under the
NCT, individuals who refrain from air travel over a certain period of time
would receive a refundable tax credit.
Air travel fulfills the administrative conditions for the implementation of
the NCT because government agencies hold complete information regarding
the identity of individuals who travel by air. Until recently, such databases exist-
ed only for international flights, but now domestic databases exist as well.4
83. See Alfred E. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfections,
and the Limits of Economics, 19 KYKLos 23 (1966).
84. The Transportation Security Administration Secure Fight Program collects data of
traveling passengers on domestic flights. See Secure Flight Program, TRANSP.
SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/secure-flight-program (last
visited February 14, 2013).
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The case of air travel also satisfies the two substantive conditions for the
implementation of the NCT. First, air travel generates high negative external
costs. The most substantial cost is the emission of greenhouse gases. Emissions
vary depending on the size of the aircraft, but in any event significantly exceed
the parallel cost generated by auto transportation." Similar to auto transporta-
tion, air travel also causes substantial air and noise pollution." The component
of external costs caused by congestion also exists in the case of air travel, alt-
hough such costs are much lower than in the case of auto transportation.'
Similar to auto travel, air travel also demands substantial infrastructure, alt-
hough the infrastructure costs per passenger are probably much lower.
Air travel also fulfills the second substantive condition for the implementa-
tion of the NCT since there is a strong correlation between air travel and socio-.
economic status. Air travel could fairly be classified as an exclusive product that
is consumed mostly by individuals of higher socioeconomic status. Its con-
sumption is a non-linear, marginal increasing function with respect to in-
come." Although air travel is a commodity that is closely correlated to socioec-
onomic status, the implementation of the NCT in the case of air travel might
not benefit the worst off individuals as much as the implementation of the NCT
in the case of auto travel. While in the case of auto travel there are strong
grounds for implementing a binary credit-whether the individual owns a car
or not-in the case of air travel the grounds for establishing a binary credit are
weaker. The fact that an individual did not make use of air travel should entitle
85. Jos Dings et al., External Costs of Aviation: Background Report, CE DELFT 47
(2002), http://www.ce.nl/art/uploads/file/02_7700_04.pdf.
86. In the case of noise pollution there is only one key parameter which affects the
magnitude of the costs-the model of the airplane. The millage of the trip does
not affect the costs because the noise externalities take place only in takeoffs and
landings. Dings and his colleagues estimate the external costs of noise at 9 EUR
per passenger for a 40-seat airplane, 5 EUR per passenger for a 100-seat airplane,
and 4 EUR per passenger for airplanes with 200 seats or more. See id. at 52.
87. Congestion cost PKT (per passenger per kilometer of travel) is $0.0017 (in 1995
USD). See Milan Jani, Aviation and Externalities: the Accomplishments and Prob-
lems, 4 TRANSP. RES. (PART D) 159, 161 (1999).
88. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 1997 the bottom quintile spent
0.5% of its annual expenditures on airfare, while the top quintile spent 1% of its
annual expenditures on airfare. In absolute terms, the top quintile spent over
eight times as much on airfare than the bottom quintile, which is substantially
higher than the general ratio of expenditures (in which the top quintile spent a bit
over four times as much as the bottom quintile). See ISSUES IN LABOR STATISTICS:
EXPENDITURES ON PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, U.S. DEP'T LABOR STATISTICS (1999),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/pdf/opbils34.pdf. Additionally, the elasticity of de-
mand for air travel in relation to income is estimated to be fairly high. See John
Mutti & Yoshitaka Murai, Airline on the North Atlantic: Is Profitability Possible?, 11
J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL'Y 45, 48 (1977).
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him or her to a credit of the marginal unit from which she abstained from con-
suming-one flight. But this is not a substantial credit. However, if the individ-
ual does not use air travel at all, it may be possible to credit her for more than
the external costs of a single flight. It is possible to attribute to her the addition-
al infrastructure costs per passenger that were eliminated, assuming that poten-
tial passenger usage is a key variable for the amount of infrastructure expenses.
In contrast to the administrative consideration, substantive considerations
suggest that there may be good reason to implement the NCT on international
flights only, since international flights may serve as a better proxy for socioeco-
nomic status. In addition, international flights may impose higher external costs
not only in absolute terms but also in relative terms. This is true because there is
no substitute good with similar external costs, such as in the case of domestic
travel. 8
One of the questions raised by the air travel example is whether the state
should internalize global externalities. A substantial portion of the external
costs of aviation listed above are costs which the state does not necessarily in-
cur, but rather are global costs that the world as a whole incurs. I refer here to
the external cost of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Economically, it might
not make sense for the state to fully internalize a social cost that it does not fully
incur. It is possible to justify the state's internalization of such external costs,
however, if it accepts international obligations to limit its generation of GHG
emission. Given such obligations, the state does have an economic interest in
internalizing the full costs of GHG emissions.
In the case of air travel, the state might have an additional interest in im-
plementing the NCT: internalizing the negative national pecuniary externalities
of traveling abroad.9o Pecuniary externalities affect the relative prices of assets,
but do not have any real effect on production. Due to the fact that such exter-
nalities do not imply economic efficiency or inefficiency, they are mostly dis-
missed in economic analysis.9 ' Although there are no pure economic grounds
for internalizing pecuniary externalities, there might still be a national interest
for internalizing such externalities in the case of air travel. Traveling abroad
leads to the use of foreign products for which there are domestic substitutes. A
domestic vacation may be a close or perfect substitute for a vacation abroad. In
addition, an individual traveling abroad is most likely to purchase foreign
products to which there exist domestic substitutes. If they had not travelled
89. Martijn Brons et al., Price Elasticity of Demand for Passenger Air Travel: A Meta-
analysis, 8 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 165, 167 (2002) (noting that long-distance flights
suffer a smaller number of substitute modes than short-distance flights).
90. DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THEORY TO
POLICY 98 (9th ed. 2007).
91. See E.J. Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J.
ECON. LIT. 1, 5-6 (1971). Following Mishan, Harvey Rosen also ignores pecuniary
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abroad, many of these individuals may have purchased similar products in the
domestic market (and would have paid a sales or VAT tax to local authorities).
The rationales for the implementation of the NCT in the air travel example
are different than those of car ownership example. In contrast to the implemen-
tation of the NCT in the auto travel context, in the air travel context there is no
reason not to use a conventional cap-and-trade mechanism. Thus, the need for
a government buy-back option is less compelling. In the air travel case, there is
no reason to assume that the government may have allocated too many permits
due to asymmetrical information. The allocation of permits is limited in
scope-one unit per individual-while additional units of pollution are taxed.
Additionally, in the air travel example there is no special justification for
endowing every individual or household with the option of using air travel. Un-
like car ownership, air travel is not perceived as a 'key good' that every house-
hold or family should have an option to enjoy.92 For the same reason, the ra-
tionale of controlling the wealth effects is not as strong; that effect is especially
relevant to key goods for which it is especially important to control the con-
straining effects of low wealth levels. The public-choice rationale is also less rel-
evant to the air travel example. Because air travel is more of an exclusive good,
the size of the group that abstains from its consumption is bigger and thus the
public-choice rationale is less relevant.
On the other hand, the enhancement of welfare and the transformation of
individuals into contributive citizens are especially strong in the case of air trav-
el. These rationales are a function of the intensity of the correlation of the con-
sumption pattern to socioeconomic status. Due to the fact that air travel is a
relatively exclusive good, especially in comparison to car ownership,93 these ra-
tionales are especially relevant to the implementation of the NCT in the air
travel example.
C. Residential Consumption of Electricity
An additional possible application of the NCT may be found in the realm
of energy consumption at large, and, more specifically, in the residential con-
sumption of electricity.
There are two forms in which the NCT may be implemented in the field of
electricity consumption.
The first form is similar to the implementation of the NCT in the case of
car usage: a binary credit given to individuals who forgo the option of a certain
form of consumption by not owning the instruments that enable that con-
92. Steven Raphael & Michael Stoll, Can Boosting Minority Car-Ownership Rates Nar-
row Inter-Racial Employment Gaps?, 2001 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB.
AFFS. 99, 101, 103 (emphasizing the near universality of car ownership and its ef-
fect on many significant dimensions in life (such as finding and maintaining a
job)).
93. U.S. DEP'T LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 88. Compare this to near universality of
car ownership. Id.
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sumption. Just as in the case of a credit provided to an individual who does not
own a car, a credit could be provided to an individual who does not own an ap-
pliance that accounts for a large share of household electricity usage over a fixed
period of time. The classic example is an air-conditioning unit. Air-
conditioning accounts for a large share of household energy consumption (and
an even greater share of discretionary electricity consumption).94
It is harder to justify a binary application of the NCT through an appliance
credit than it is to justify a binary credit in the case of car ownership. Car own-
ership generates substantial external costs on its own-costs which are not
simply functions of usage-and accordingly there is a strong justification for
eliminating any credit from individuals who own a car. The same cannot be
said of the ownership of any electric appliance. The appliance credit also raises
an administrative problem that does not apply to car ownership. In contrast to
the car example, there is no government agency that collects data regarding the
identity of individuals who own certain appliances. The implementation of the
NCT to electricity consumption would entail incurring substantial administra-
tive costs for data collection, and would also raise civil-liberty concerns because
the government would need to collect additional data that it does not currently
possess.
The second potential form is a credit for households that have low electrical
consumption. As stated in Part II, this method may be equivalent to a tradable
and refundable cap-and-trade regime, in which households are endowed with
permits for electricity consumption that they may sell to other users, or even
back to the government. This regime seems to fulfill the three conditions for the
implementation of the NCT.
At first glance, the administrative costs of such implementation seem high.
Such costs would include the collection of data regarding household electrical
consumption and the administration costs of permit transactions. However, the
administration is less complex and costly than it seems.95 Under the regime that
Debbie Niemeirer and her colleagues have proposed, households would be en-
dowed with permits for GHG emissions. The utility company would then ob-
tain from the household the permits needed to cover the GHG emissions for
producing the electricity that the household has consumed. The utility compa-
ny would then transfer permits to the regulator for the aggregated amount of
GHG emission it generated by providing electricity to households. If a house-
hold intends to consume a greater amount of electricity than the GHG emission
94. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, air conditioners ac-
count for sixteen percent of end-use residential electricity consumption, more
than any other appliance. See End Use Consumption of Electricity 2001, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/emeu/recs/recs2001/enduse2001/
enduse2001.html (last visited February 14, 2013).
95. D. Niemeier et al., Rethinking Downstream Regulation: California's Opportunity to
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permits enable, it must purchase GHG permits from a lesser-consuming house-
hold.
Niemeirer and her colleagues have labeled this regime a 'household cap-
and-trade' regime (HHCT). They argue that administering the HHCT would
not be as costly and complex as it might initially seem. Households have a bill-
ing account with a utility company, which includes complete information re-
garding the electricity consumption of each household. The only additional ac-
counts needed are for the household's permit balance and the permits that it
owes for the current billing cycle. Platforms for trading pollution permits al-
ready exist, and the transactions costs are fairly limited. The main difference be-
tween the HHCT and a NCT is that, under the NCT, households have the op-
tion to sell back to the government the permits they have not used. The price in
this transaction may exceed the price offered by other households, preventing
inefficient pollution.96
Needless to say, the first substantive condition-that the commodity to
which the NCT applies generates significant negative externalities-is also ful-
filled in the case of electricity consumption. The production of electricity is ac-
companied by significant CO2 emission. Residential electricity consumption ac-
counted for 15.1 PERCENT of all CO, emission in the U.S. in 2009.97
The applicability of the second substantive condition for the application of
the NCT-correlation to socioeconomic status-is slightly more problematic.
The form suggested for the application of the NCT is not binary, and thus the
correlation between the NCT and socioeconomic status may be weaker than in
the other examples. As stated above, binary applications of the NCT correlate
more strongly with socioeconomic status. Although the correlation between
electricity consumption and socioeconomic status is not as strong as in a binary
implementation of the NCT such as in the car example, electricity is still a nor-
mal commodity correlated to income.9' And in the case of electricity, consump-
tion by individuals with higher incomes will be greater, and thus the correlation
between the NCT and socioeconomic status will be maintained.
The rationales applicable to the implementation of the NCT in the case of
residential electricity consumption are distinctive from those applicable to the
car and air travel examples. The governmental buy-back option is especially rel-
evant to the residential electric consumption example. In contrast to the air
travel and car examples, in the electricity example the individuals or household
96. Id. at 3443-44.
97. Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2009, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
22-23 (2011), http://www.eia.gov/environmentlemissions/ghgreport/pdf/0573
(2009).pdf.
98. The elasticity of electricity consumption to income is greater than zero, which
means it is positively correlated to income, although it is much smaller than unity.
Given an increase in income, the consumption of electricity will increase, but at a
substantially lower rate than the rate of the increase in income. See E. Rephael
Braunch, Short-Run Income Elasticity of Demand for Residential Electricity Using
Consumer Expenditure Survey Data, 14 ENERGY J. 111, 119 (1993).
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are not endowed with a unitary permit, but rather are given permits for several
kilowatt hours of consumption (with the option of using only some portion of
the permits). Under such conditions, a cap-and-trade regime makes more sense
than a binary credit.
Electricity is a "basic" commodity in the individual's consumption pattern:
it can be used for many distinctive forms of consumption and thus there is
much greater uncertainty in assessing the subjective value the individual attrib-
utes it. As a consequence of the uncertainty regarding the value the individual
actually attributes to each unit of consumption, electricity consumption pre-
sents a classic case for the implementation of the governmental buy-back op-
tion.
The other rationales for the NCT are less relevant to electricity consump-
tion. In the case of consumption (which is on a continuum), controlling for in-
come is less important. There is no crucial threshold such as in the binary case.
Both rationales-enhancing welfare and acknowledging contributions-are less
relevant in cases of a continuous credit. This is true because there is no well-
defined borderline separating the individuals receiving the credit and the indi-
viduals who don't. They are merely on different points along a continuum, and
thus the credit does not assist in signaling certain individuals as contributors.
The same reasoning applies to the public-choice rationale: because the groups
are not well defined with clear borders separating between a small and big
group, the conditions for lobby formation are not fulfilled.
Overall, it seems that the best form for implementing the NCT on residen-
tial consumption of energy is through a permit regime administered through
the utility companies. Under such a regime, individuals whose consumption is
lower than that allowed by their permits can sell some of their permits to other
households or back to the government. Although the correlation between soci-
oeconomic status and electricity consumption presumably would not be as
strong as in cases of a binary credit and exclusive commodities, there would still
exist a correlation between the two.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that beneficial omissions do not receive the atten-
tion they deserve, and that the option of internalizing externalities through
crediting such omissions has largely been neglected.
This Article has raised several possible advantages of internalizing externali-
ties by crediting omissions. First, on economic grounds, such internalization
may be more efficient both as a mechanism for internalization of externalities
and as a distributive mechanism. It eliminates inefficient pollution that may ac-
company a conventional cap-and-trade mechanism. Framing an incentive as a
credit may generate a stronger effect than framing the incentive as a tax or fine,
and thus may reach the optimal pollution level with a lower level of real trans-
action costs. In cases in which there is a strong correlation between omissions
and low socioeconomic status, internalization through crediting the omission
may enable efficient redistribution. The transfer of resources in the context of
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merit-based desert eliminates the stigma costs that accompany conventional
transfer programs, and thus enhances the recipients' welfare to a greater extent.
Second, crediting omissions may assist in achieving the desirable goal of
framing the worst off individuals in society as contributing citizens. A mecha-
nism that highlights the contribution of the worst off to society transforms
them into active contributing citizens both in their own eyes and in the eyes of
others. The passive inaction of not consuming dirty commodities is framed as
an active contribution-one that makes an important contribution to the social
good.
Third, on political economy grounds, crediting omissions might be more
feasible than other schemes for internalizing external costs of pollution.
This Article has also suggested a mechanism for acknowledging in-kind
contributions through omissions in the field of environmental policy: a nega-
tive-consumption tax. A few possible implementations of the NCT were dis-
cussed: (1) an NCT for individuals who do not own a car; (2) an NCT for indi-
viduals who do not make use of air transportation; and (3) an NCT for
individuals who consume low levels of residential electricity.
In this Article, I have explored the normative justifications for internaliza-
tion of beneficial omissions on three planes: efficiency, reinforcement of active
citizenship, and political economy. I have also sought to demonstrate the feasi-
bility of internalizing beneficial omissions through a negative tax mechanism, in
cases such as car ownership, air travel and electric consumption. Although the
environmental field is the ideal locus for implementing the internalization of
beneficial omissions, such internalizations may well have much wider ramifica-
tions.
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